

The Rt Hon Greg Clark MP
Secretary of State for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy
By email: corporategovernance@beis.gov.uk

17 February 2017

Dear Secretary of State

**FRC Response to the Department for Business, Energy and Industrial Strategy
Corporate Governance Reform Green Paper**

Thank you for the opportunity to respond to the Green Paper. We welcome the Government's focus on corporate governance and the open debate it has encouraged.

UK corporate governance is highly regarded internationally and this must be maintained as we compete for investment and the establishment of successful businesses in this country.

However, demands on the corporate governance framework are expanding and more needs to be done to improve the culture of business and hence public trust. Given the importance of reputation to companies' success, this is important to individual businesses, to investors, as well as to the country as a whole.

In designing change, we need to build on the existing strengths of the UK system: the unitary board, strong shareholder rights and the 'comply or explain' approach have delivered success and should not be compromised. Investor stewardship is generally a powerful means of holding companies to account and now needs to be complemented by a stakeholder voice to help make it more effective.

Corporate governance principles must be clear and relevant and assist boards in developing strategy and delivering performance. They cannot by themselves be expected to stand in for reforms of pensions, employment, competition or tax legislation.

The need for reform lies in four areas:


- The interests of major stakeholders. The Companies Act places a duty on directors of all companies to promote the success of the company, and in so doing have regard to a range of other factors, such as long-term consequences, the environment, employees, suppliers and customers. This duty must be reinvigorated. Companies should be required to report more effectively on how they have discharged it. The Strategic Report Regulations should require this reporting, which will enable the FRC to monitor and enforce the requirement. Additionally, the FRC proposes that corporate governance reporting is brought within the ambit of our monitoring powers so that we are able to consider the quality and integrity of such reporting and engage with companies accordingly.
- Executive remuneration. The role and remit of the remuneration committee should be extended to cover pay policies throughout the organisation. Remuneration policy and

payments should have a much clearer link to delivery of strategy, focusing on what executives need to achieve, not on rewarding gains from share price movements driven by market factors rather than company performance. Remuneration packages, and related reporting, should be simplified. Boards should make judgements and exercise discretion to ensure that remuneration genuinely reflects business results. To enhance investor stewardship, we believe a significant minority vote against remuneration reports should trigger further consultation and in certain circumstances a second vote that would be binding.

- Large private companies need to be more accountable to their stakeholders given their significance to the public interest and the privilege and benefits of limited liability status. We support the introduction of corporate governance principles for such companies and associated reporting. The FRC is well placed to develop such a code and monitor its effectiveness, subject to appropriate regulatory underpinning and resources.
- Effective enforcement of the law is also necessary. The regulatory framework is fragmented, with different tools and regulators for enforcement action. There are gaps in our own area of financial reporting: we have powers to investigate and prosecute accountants and actuaries, but not directors who are not members of these professions. Such gaps need to be closed and better coordination between regulators needs to be achieved. We suggest that the entire annual report and accounts, and associated issues of integrity, be brought within our monitoring and enforcement activity.

We have set out our proposals in more detail in the attached response and look forward to developing our thinking with you.

Stephen Haddrill
Chief Executive

Yours sincerely,


RESPONSE TO THE DETAILED QUESTIONS

Executive pay

Question 1. Do shareholders need stronger powers to improve their ability to hold companies to account on executive pay and performance? If so, which of the options mentioned in the Green Paper would you support? Are there other options that should be considered?

The UK's corporate governance framework promotes the role of directors to scrutinise and ensure that companies are being led and managed to achieve success. The key, though not only, relationship is between the company and its shareholders. Shareholders already have a range of powers to allow them to hold companies to account on executive pay and performance, but there is a need for greater transparency and accountability by companies to wider stakeholders.

Good corporate reporting provides reliable and credible information, but companies must be encouraged to use their reporting to explain how they are acting responsibly and with integrity. The 'comply or explain' nature of the UK Corporate Governance Code (the Code) allows companies to innovate. It can assist in delivering high quality reporting and disclosure on governance approaches and other issues, including risk and viability. However, there are instances in which it may be more appropriate for reporting to be required by law or regulation, or for the two to be used together.

The challenge is to ensure companies provide visibility over their decisions and actions, which requires simpler, better and more focused disclosure. We support better reporting on topics such as the link and proportion between business results and remuneration outcomes; the allocation of value generated between, for example, pension funding, dividends, directors' remuneration, research and development and capital investment; and the employment policies for staff throughout organisations.

The Code recommends that "when, in the opinion of the board, a significant proportion of votes have been cast against a resolution at any general meeting, the company should explain when announcing the results of voting what actions it intends to take to understand the reasons behind the vote result." The recommendation applies to all resolutions and while the level of votes considered significant is a matter for the board, 20 per cent may be an appropriate level. Explanations where there have been significant votes against tend to be poor. The Code should be revised to clarify expectations around shareholder consultation and reporting where there is a single, or recurring, significant vote against resolutions, including what percentage might be considered significant. (Option v)

A revised Code provision should be supported by legislation providing for an escalation of options when a company receives a significant number of votes against the remuneration report. Such an approach could include significant recurring votes against remuneration reports triggering a vote on the remuneration policy to be brought forward, or a requirement for a binding vote on the remuneration report and related outcomes. These changes would be supported by amendments to Code and related guidance. (Options ii and iv)

The expectation is that substantial bonuses should only reward exceptional performance. However, this appears not always to have been the case in recent years. The focus of engagement on remuneration has tended to be around the design of remuneration policies, but more attention should be on the delivery of strategy and links to remuneration outcomes.

The Code could be amended to enable improved reporting by companies about their approach and their engagement with shareholders on remuneration issues.

In addition, board disclosures regarding remuneration should be strengthened to allow for in depth scrutiny and more effective challenge. Companies should be encouraged to report more transparently on the business results they have achieved and how these are linked to remuneration outcomes and targets. Disclosures should also explain the degree of 'stretch' in future targets and the range of potential outcomes. Such reporting will help shareholders understand the targets and how the directors consider the business results have led to the 'right' remuneration structures and outcomes for the company. This would also link strongly to the exercise of discretion by remuneration committees. If particular remuneration reporting is desirable, implementation of the requirements would be most effective if required by legislation, with support from FRC guidance. (Option v)

Remuneration policies are often complicated and there is a lack of clarity about outcomes, which can result in surprise when the final pay award is reported. There are a number of significant contractual issues with binding votes on remuneration reports, so thought will need to be given to the timing of payments to executives. Amendments to make remuneration reporting more straightforward may remove some uncertainty surrounding implementation, and therefore the need for a binding vote. As outlined above, a binding vote on the remuneration outcomes may be most effective where there have been significant recurring votes against the remuneration report. (Option i)

The role of the remuneration committee should be extended so that greater emphasis is placed on designing remuneration policies with reference to the long-term success of the company. Remuneration committees should take a wider role in relation to the company's policies and procedures throughout the organisation and the behaviours they are driving. This should involve a greater consideration of incentivisation and links to succession planning to ensure that the company is encouraging engagement of its people and the desired culture throughout the organisation. There is a strong link to the FRC's 'Corporate Culture and the Role of Boards: Report of Observations'. (Option v)

Taken together with other changes proposed by the Green Paper, these amendments would help provide simpler remuneration structures; greater visibility over remuneration decisions, including their justification; and consequences for companies not addressing those points, or meeting the needs of stakeholders.

Question 2. Does more need to be done to encourage institutional and retail investors to make full use of their existing and any new voting powers on pay? Do you support any of the options mentioned? Are there other ideas that should be considered?

The FRC is considering how to highlight investors' best practice reporting on voting activities, as we support shareholders making full use of their rights. This is encouraged by the UK Stewardship Code, where the expectation is that all shares will be voted. However, stewardship is more than just voting, and it is important that regulations drive high quality, considered engagement between companies and investors.

Reporting of voting activity must be applied at the correct level, and it is unclear which entity in the investment chain might be subject to this reporting – for example, asset owners or asset managers. Under Section 1277 of the Companies Act 2006 (the Companies Act), the Treasury or the Secretary of State may make regulations requiring institutions to provide information about the exercise of voting rights attached to shares. The Government may wish to exercise this regulatory power if it believes that disclosure of votes will encourage shareholders to make

full use of their existing powers on remuneration. However, focus on voting alone may result in increasing dependency on proxy advice. (Option i)

Some shareholders, particularly retail shareholders, continue to find it difficult to engage with the voting process. 'BIS Research Paper Number 261: Exploring the Intermediated Shareholder Model' outlined options for increasing the ability of retail shareholders to access information about their investments. We understand that the Government plans to consult on dematerialisation later this year, and welcome a consideration of the options to help protect and enhance retail shareholders' ability to vote and engage with their investments. (Option iii)

Question 3. Do steps need to be taken to improve the effectiveness of remuneration committees, and their advisers, in particular to encourage them to engage more effectively with shareholder and employee views before developing pay policies? Do you support any of the options set out in the Green Paper? Are there any other options you want to suggest?

Remuneration should focus on aligning reward with long-term value creation. In 2014 the Code was amended to reinforce the importance of this longer-term view. Main Principle D.1 of the Code provides that "Executive directors' remuneration should be designed to promote the long-term success of the company. Performance-related elements should be transparent, stretching and rigorously applied." It was felt that the previous Code wording – for example, on the need to be able to "attract, retain and motivate" directors – was capable of being read otherwise. In regard to the performance-related elements being "transparent, stretching and rigorously applied", the FRC's expectation is that companies should set and report on targets that do not encourage excessive risk-taking and over which boards have effective control.

Boards and remuneration committees play an important role in ensuring the alignment of pay and behaviour and should be required to consult on the nature and structure of incentives they are setting. They should then explain to investors and employees how they have aligned remuneration structures. Remuneration and risk committees are in a position to support boards in evaluating alignment between incentives, values and behaviours, and it will be important for any amendments to the remit for remuneration committees to align with other changes regarding the integration of a wider stakeholder view. (Option i)

In addition to ongoing engagement with shareholders, remuneration committees should be encouraged to make better use of the annual general meeting as a vehicle to outline how they have consulted shareholders, what targets have been set and how the remuneration outcomes relate to business results. As explained above, consultation on an amended role for remuneration committees should involve consideration of the use of discretion and how this may best be exercised. Remuneration committees should have responsibility for a wider remit including the policies and procedures throughout the organisation and the behaviours they drive. They should particularly report on the link between remuneration structure and strategy. These changes could be reflected in a revised Code or related guidance. The FRC could also consult on the recommendation that remuneration committee members sit on the committee for 12 months before becoming Chairman. (Option ii)

These proposals, alongside those under Question 1, would strengthen the link between behaviours, values and pay throughout an organisation, and require further consideration of, and reporting on, how remuneration outcomes are justified in these contexts.

Question 4. Should a new pay ratio reporting requirement be introduced? If so, what form of reporting would be most useful? How can misleading interpretations and inappropriate comparisons (for example, between companies in different sectors) be avoided? Would other measures be more effective? Please give reasons for your answer.

Any requirement for pay ratio disclosure should be coordinated with other existing disclosures, for example under the Remuneration Report. The way in which these requirements might best be incorporated should be the subject of specific consultation with companies and preparers. The Government should also consider a wide-ranging inquiry into the issues raised by the quantum, growth, disparity and performance-linkage of rewards received by senior executives in a range of corporate forms, and the reporting that might be most useful to shareholders and others in considering these issues. Lastly, attention should be paid in this context to any practices considered elsewhere, for example in the United States.

Question 5. Should the existing, qualified requirements to disclose the performance targets that trigger annual bonus payments be strengthened? How could this be done without compromising commercial confidentiality? Do you support any of the options outlined in the Green Paper? Do you have any other suggestions?

As outlined above, the FRC believes that the links between remuneration outcomes and business results should be strengthened and we would be willing to consult on such changes to the Code and related guidance. If agreed, the FRC would collaborate with companies, shareholders, employees and others to develop guidance to support any legislation in this area. This guidance might most usefully cover not only the disclosure of bonus targets, but a number of the other areas also addressed in this section.

Question 6. How could long-term incentive plans be better aligned with the long-term interests of quoted companies and shareholders? Should holding periods be increased from a minimum of three to a minimum of five years for share options awarded to executives? Please give reasons for your answers.

There are conflicting views about the influence of long-term incentive plans on behaviour. However, longer vesting periods are one way to extend the remuneration horizon, and therefore the decision-making horizon, of executives. The issue of quantum, growth, disparity and performance-linkage should be considered in a wide-ranging review of remuneration practices and incentives. As in our response to Question 5, we could collaborate with companies, shareholders, employees and others to develop guidance to support any legislative changes the Government wishes to make in this area.

Strengthening the employee, customer and wider stakeholder voice

Question 7. How can the way in which the interests of employees, customers and wider stakeholders are taken into account at board level in large UK companies be strengthened? Are there any existing examples of good practice that you would like to draw to our attention? Which, if any, of the options (or combination of options) described in the Green Paper would you support? Please explain your reasons.

The Companies Act clearly sets out a wide range of directors' duties in sections 170-177. The section 172 duty requires directors to act in a way that is most likely to promote the success of the company for the benefit of its members as a whole. In doing so they should have regard to a range of relevant factors. As we explain below, the FRC considers that better reporting on the way in which these factors are considered when boards are making key decisions would be helpful, as would a more appropriate mechanism better to hold directors to account for their

actions. There is a clear link between the duty under section 172 and the reputation and brand value of companies, which encourages directors and responsible shareholders to engage in a full consideration of these wider factors.

The FRC's report on corporate culture found that a clearly defined purpose which goes beyond profit, and well-chosen values that are translated into a set of expected behaviours embedded throughout the company, are essential for a healthy culture. Ultimately it is the responsibility of the board to achieve a culture that takes account of the views of wider stakeholders, and we support more discussion of these views at board level. Their views could be presented to boards in a number of ways, but it may be most appropriate to propose, through guidance, a small range of options allowing for flexibility and innovation. The FRC will consult on amendments to the Code and related guidance to explain the range of best practice options for incorporating the views of a wider range of stakeholders, and will encourage disclosures about which structures have been put in place and why these were considered most appropriate. (Option i)

The FRC considers it appropriate to amend the Strategic Report Regulations to guide boards about linking their duties under section 172 to their reporting under section 414C. The Strategic Report Regulations apply to all medium and large companies and the FRC's Guidance on the Strategic Report is best practice for all companies, therefore it has a wider scope than the Code, which applies only to premium-listed companies. The requirements of the Strategic Report are subject to assessment by the FRC's Corporate Reporting Review to ensure compliance with the law. (Option iv)

There is currently no specific reporting requirement on how the matters referred to in section 172 are taken into account by directors in promoting the success of the company. Ultimately, boards should be required to demonstrate how they had regard to wider stakeholders in their key decisions. There is a need to explore mechanisms which will enable this section to deliver its purpose more effectively. This would best be achieved by introducing a legislative requirement to report against the section. The FRC could consequently amend the Guidance on the Strategic Report to cover how these factors were taken into account, describing boards' consultation mechanisms, the issues considered and trade-offs. It would be important that any revised reporting requirements under section 172 were subject to an appropriate monitoring and enforcement regime, and the role of auditors in this regard may be important. (Option iv)

There is also insufficient communication about related issues which are of key importance to shareholders and wider stakeholders, such as the company's strategy for allocating the value created, for example, between pension funding, dividends, directors' remuneration, research and development and capital investment. It is important that shareholders and other stakeholders understand how companies have allocated value created across these areas in accordance with the published strategy, and how this reflects their consideration of wider stakeholders and the long-term success of the company. The FRC would be willing to consult on changes to the Code and related guidance to encourage reporting on the allocation of value by companies.

Additionally, the FRC proposes that corporate governance reporting is brought within the ambit of our monitoring powers so that we are able to consider the quality of governance reporting and engage with companies accordingly.

The Code also recommends that companies report on their viability. Provision C.2.2 of the Code provides that "Taking account of the company's current position and principal risks, the directors should explain in the annual report how they have assessed the prospects of the company, over what period they have done so and why they consider that period to be

appropriate. The directors should state whether they have a reasonable expectation that the company will be able to continue in operation and meet its liabilities as they fall due over the period of their assessment, drawing attention to any qualifications or assumptions as necessary.” The period over which viability is to be reported is subject to the boards’ judgement, but recent monitoring found that many companies had chosen to coalesce around their three year strategy planning period. This period was chosen regardless of the longer running pensions covenants and other long-term debt agreements that might be in place. We would be prepared to consult on whether companies should more explicitly consider longstanding obligations in making their disclosures.

Mechanisms to hold directors properly to account for their actions do not always work effectively. This does not allow stakeholders to raise concerns, which may be connected to a lack of trust in business. Consideration should be given to the introduction of a ‘super-complaint’ system, as there is in Consumer Law. This would allow registered public interest bodies to bring complaints in specified areas. This may allow complaints to be considered where companies are suspected of causing significant harm to their shareholders and wider stakeholders. Thought would need to be given to whether a system of designated bodies would be appropriate, but the introduction of such a scheme may help increase trust in business, improve the effectiveness of the enforcement regime and streamline the consideration of complaints amongst relevant regulators. If the Government considers this useful there would need to be a strong and clear regulatory system in place, with the relevant parties appropriately resourced to consider the complaints raised.

These changes would, together with the other proposals, increase the visibility of board decision-making and allow stakeholders to understand how different factors have been assessed and how these relate to strategic and long-term decision-making. This information would help hold boards to account for their actions.

Question 8. Which type of company do you think should be the focus for any steps to strengthen the stakeholder voice? Should there be an employee number or other size threshold?

There are already a number of thresholds for reporting, and in the interests of balancing transparency and cost it would be most effective to use a threshold already in general use. The existing thresholds for reporting in the Companies Act such as those in the Strategic Report Regulations may be an appropriate starting point. The Government should also consider how these thresholds might be consolidated, as overlapping requirements can create complexity for companies.

Question 9. How should reform be taken forward? Should a legislative, code-based or voluntary approach be used to drive change? Please explain your reasons, including any evidence on likely costs and benefits.

Our response to this question is provided under Question 7.

Corporate governance in large, privately-held businesses

Question 10. What is your view of the case for strengthening the corporate governance framework for the UK's largest, privately-held businesses? What do you see as the benefits for doing so? What are the risks to be considered? Are there any existing examples of good practice in privately-held businesses that you would like to draw to our attention?

The ownership structure of private companies has commonly been seen as a reason not to require the same level of transparency about their governance. However, many large private companies are economically significant and there are strong arguments to suggest that they should be more transparent. The needs of a wider range of stakeholders are often just as relevant for large, private companies as they are for public companies. Issues of economic significance, sectoral importance and other reasons may justify further reporting by such companies. Consideration should also be given to how larger private companies take into account the views of stakeholders, as outlined above in relation to public companies.

The FRC stands ready to develop a governance framework for larger private companies. This would need to be tailored to take into account their specific and different ownership and governance arrangements. It should be underpinned by regulation as the Code is with the Listing Rules, recognising that private companies and their shareholders have a close relationship. It may be appropriate to introduce a requirement to report against a best practice code with private companies explaining their governance approach. If there was a regulatory requirement for reporting, thought would need to be given to how this would be monitored and enforced.

Any governance standards for large private companies should also be the minimum requirements for companies with either a standard listing or which are quoted on the AIM market.

Question 11. If you think that the corporate governance framework should be strengthened for the largest privately-held businesses, which businesses should be in scope? Where should any size threshold be set?

A range of reporting thresholds is already in place. In the interests of balancing transparency and cost it would be most effective to use a threshold already in general use. The focus should be large private companies, where a wider group of stakeholders may be affected by the company's actions and where their sustained success is a matter of public interest. This may be in relation to their contribution to the economy, the extent of employment they provide, their sector's strategic importance or other factors. A "large private company" should be proportionately defined by a suitable significant minimum threshold of turnover and/or number of employees, for example the Private Equity Reporting Group (PERG) uses a threshold of 1000 employees. Thought must also be given to strategic industry and public interest factors, and whether to apply these requirements to foreign subsidiaries and subsidiaries of UK listed companies.

Question 12. If you think that strengthening is needed how should this be achieved? Should legislation be used or would a voluntary approach be preferable? How could compliance be monitored?

Please see our response to Questions 10 and 11.

Question 13. Should non-financial reporting requirements in the future be applied on the basis of a size threshold rather than based on the legal form of a business?

Both size thresholds and consideration of the legal form of the business can be useful when setting reporting requirements. That said, any new requirements should be proportionate to the size and complexity of a company's business.

We are aware that non-financial reporting is of interest to investors and other stakeholders and it may also be of relevance to users in large private companies. Through its Guidance on the Strategic Report the FRC encourages all companies to disclose non-financial information that is relevant to investors.

For future changes to non-financial reporting we encourage the Government to use existing thresholds within the Companies Act, as there are already multiple thresholds for reporting (small, medium, large, quoted, Public Interest Entities, etc.). The Government should also consider how these thresholds might be consolidated to avoid overlapping requirements. We note that BEIS has recently published regulations to implement the EU Directive on non-financial and diversity information that introduces a new reporting threshold for large public interest entities with more than 500 employees.

Other issues

Question 14. Is the current corporate governance framework in the UK providing the right combination of high standards and low burdens? Apart from the issues addressed specifically in this Green Paper can you suggest any other improvements to the framework?

The 'comply or explain' principle has served the UK well, helped us to remain at the forefront of developing good governance practice and attracted substantial capital. The Code and related guidance are subject to regular review, as we recognise that the governance framework needs to evolve with societal and economic needs.

The regulatory framework is fragmented and enforcement is not fully effective at present. While guidance and the role of professional bodies play an important part in holding directors to account, under this complex framework a range of corporate investigations take place. This has the capacity to delay and dilute effective enforcement against misconduct. We recommend the Government establishes a more effective mechanism for holding directors and others in senior positions to account when they fail in their responsibilities.

The FRC promotes trusted behaviour and information by:

- monitoring the quality of accounts published by public companies in line with the legal framework including accounting standards and the overriding requirement to give a true and fair view; making clear our expectations of how companies and other entities should approach financial reporting and regularly highlighting the matters we regard as particularly important;
- monitoring and reporting publicly on the quality of the audit of listed and other major public interest entities and the policies and procedures supporting audit quality at the major audit firms in the UK and determining proportionate sanctions where necessary; and highlighting key messages on audit quality for audit firms and audit committees; and
- oversight of the regulatory activities of the accountancy and actuarial professional bodies and through our own independent disciplinary arrangements for public interest cases involving accountants and actuaries, as well as by cooperating with other bodies – such

as the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Financial Conduct Authority and the Pensions Regulator – which rely on the professionalism of their work.

Our functions derive from a number of sources. Some statutory powers have been delegated directly to the FRC and the FRC's Conduct Committee. Some of our functions are supported by statutory obligations on other parties to meet our requirements and/or participate in arrangements provided by the FRC. Others have no statutory backing but derive their authority from widespread support from, and voluntary arrangements with, our stakeholders.

We are also responsible for the UK Corporate Governance and Stewardship Codes, which promote trustworthy information and high standards of behaviour by boards and investors. The quality of information to shareholders on governance matters is of considerable importance to enable them to hold the company to account. We suggest that the entire annual report and accounts, and associated issues of integrity, be brought within our monitoring activity.

At present the FRC can take action against directors who are auditors, accountants or actuaries, but we cannot take action against other directors even where the evidence suggests they are equally culpable of a breach of regulations. We would be willing to accept additional responsibility to sanction all directors, regardless of their membership of a professional body, when we raise concerns about financial reporting or connected integrity.

The FRC also proposes to consult on amendments to the Code, non-financial reporting and related guidance. Our response recommends consulting on amendments as follows:

- To outline how companies should engage with shareholders, including methods of 'escalation' in instances of significant votes against resolutions. We also support consideration of regulatory changes in this area, for example recurring significant votes against the remuneration report triggering a binding vote on a revised remuneration policy to be brought forward or a binding vote on the remuneration report and related outcomes.
- To extend the remit of the remuneration committee and to encourage more transparent reporting, including: encouraging them to have a wider responsibility for the company's policies throughout the organisation, how they should engage with shareholders, how Committees may go about using their discretion, better reporting on the links between business targets and remuneration outcomes, including target setting, and whether annual general meetings may be better utilised.
- To consult on a requirement for remuneration committee members to sit on the committee for 12 months before becoming Chairman.
- Better to take into account wider stakeholders and factors under section 172 and to encourage greater transparency on how their interests have been taken account of in key decisions. We suggest the Government introduce a requirement to report against section 172.
- To improve disclosure about the strategy for the allocation of value generated to, for example, pension funding, dividends, directors' remuneration, research and development and capital investment and how the value was allocated in practice.

We support the Government's consideration of retail shareholders' involvement in the voting process. We also recommend a governance framework for private companies, with appropriate regulatory underpinning and monitoring.